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Abstract 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a set of activities that forms part of the 
strategies for peacebuilding after civil war. DDR has become the standard way of addressing security 
threats in immediate post-conflict situations. However, DDR is designed to promote national security, 
rather than human or community security. This creates severe obstacles for success, if success is seen in 
terms of overall security promotion rather than defined merely by the number of arms collected and 
people demobilized. The reason is that if security at the community level is not improved, then people 
will be unable to abandon armed violence as a way of protection and of making a living. Disarmament in 
such a situation will probably be only temporary. Thus, it is a necessity for DDR to aim at community 
security. However, when community security becomes the aim, then this opens up questions about 
whether DDR is the most appropriate strategy. At best, it can be part of a more wide-ranging strategy, 
which in addition to top-down DDR programs also involves community-based activities. Altogether, 
such a holistic security promotion strategy should endeavor to make people and communities better able 
to protect themselves and to create a living that does not depend on war and violence. In other words, it 
should aim at making guns redundant. ‘Community-based’ and ‘Second-generation’ DDR initiatives lend 
inspiration for such a wider security promotion approach. What they show is that the optimal approach 
is very context-specific. An analysis of the conflict, of local security mechanisms, and of the needs and 
capacities of communities, therefore, has to be the first step, despite the fact that this takes valuable time. 
 
 
Introduction 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a set of activities that 
forms part of the strategies for peacebuilding after civil war. Peace agreements often 
include provisions for DDR in order to reduce the number of people under arms and help 
former soldiers to find alternative, peaceful ways of living. In various post-conflict 
countries, national programs for DDR have been implemented, usually by a coalition of 
bilateral donors, international organisations (such as the United Nations and World 
Bank), and the government of the country in question. In addition, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) participate in the implementation of DDR, particularly in the 
reintegration phase.  
 In most cases, soldiers voluntarily submit to DDR by handing over their weapons 
in return for support in making the transfer to civilian life. Often, they are cantoned in 
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camps for a period, after which they receive „reinsertion‟ assistance. This assistance 
consists of payments or „start-up kits‟ to help them set up a business or develop another 
mode of living. Next, reintegration is to take place, a longer process by which people 
again find a place in their society and community. DDR often aims to assist in this 
process by providing vocational training. However, while official DDR programs aim to 
support the reintegration process, it is for the most part seen to be a task of development 
organizations and of communities themselves. 
 Recently, criticisms have mounted regarding the limited success of DDR programs 
(c.f. Muggah, 2009). Compared with the achievement of tangible targets such as 
collecting arms or demobilizing soldiers, it is much more difficult to ensure that safety 
and security levels are enhanced and that the rehabilitation of former fighters and their 
dependants proceeds smoothly. Effective reintegration of ex-combatants into potentially 
hostile communities is even more ambitious, and the lack of economic opportunities in 
post-conflict circumstances makes economic reintegration a daunting task. The question 
looms at large on whether DDR actually contributes to any significant improvement in 
security in the end.  
 Some DDR programmers repudiate that such longer-term aims are not, and cannot 
realistically be, part of DDR programs. DDR often has to be carried out under high time 
pressures, because of the need to quickly establish stability and show people that peace 
can bring them benefits. This time pressure means that DDR can only have limited 
ambitions. DDR should not be seen as a panacea to the entire range of security threats in 
a post-conflict environment. In the aftermath of war many security threats can come to 
the fore, such as political and criminal violence, which DDR is not designed to cope with. 
Nonetheless, DDR is a significant aspect in a wide spectrum of post-conflict strategies 
aimed to overcome armed conflict. The place of DDR therein, however, remains 
unspecified, and how DDR can better contribute to post-conflict stability is a difficult 
question. Even if we agree that DDR can only have limited ambitions, the question of 
whether it contributes to sustainable security promotion remains pressing.  
 We suggest that DDR can only contribute to long-term security if it is part of a 
wider set of security promotion strategies. In particular, we argue that the shortcomings 
of current DDR practice can only be overcome if its relation to what we call „community 
security‟ receives more attention. In this article we explore the connections between DDR 
programs on the one hand, and community-level security on the other. DDR programs are 
often based on a logic of state security – of reinstating the monopoly on the use of force 
by the state – and this is indeed an important prerequisite for peace. But it may not 
necessarily help promote community-level security, which, as we shall argue, should be 
the overall aim of post-conflict security promotion. 
 The article is based on extensive literature study, which was carried out as part of 
a research project on Security Promotion in Fragile States undertaken by the Dutch 
Peace, Security, and Development Network, which includes the Centre for Conflict 
Studies (CCS) of Utrecht University, the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and 
Management (CICAM) of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Dutch ministries of 
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Foreign Affairs and Defense,  the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands 
Institute for International Relations „Clingendael‟, and several Dutch NGOs including 
IKV Pax Christi, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), the Dutch 
Refugee Council, and PSO. The research has been jointly carried out by the CCS, IKV 
Pax Christi, CRU and CICAM.
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 We take as our starting point the concept of community security, both as a process 
and as an end state. The first part of the article elaborates on community security and its 
mechanisms. In the second part, we analyse DDR programs from the perspective of 
community security. Third, we discuss community-based DDR initiatives. Finally, we 
explore how connecting these approaches may lead to integrated, and more successful, 
security promotion strategies. 
 
 
Concept and Mechanisms of Community Security  
 
Community Security 
 
 Maintaining security is a fundamental objective of a government and security is a 
precondition for other goals. Yet, security is multi-faceted, “consisting of human, 
physical, economic and socio-political security, failure of which has resulted in structural 
violence and demand for arms” (Mkutu, 2004: 7). Different actors have different 
perspectives on security, influenced by culture and circumstance. While some define 
security in military terms, others emphasize economic or livelihood security, or the 
security that being part of a group provides.
2
 
 With this realization the concept of human security emerged, re-balancing debates 
on security away from an exclusive focus on military security of the state, towards a 
security of the people whom the state serves.
.
 The UNDP defined human security to have 
seven main aspects of which „community security‟ is one. Community security then 
refers to the security people derive “from their membership in a group – a family, 
community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group that can provide a cultural identity 
and a treasuring set of values. Such groups also offer practical support” (UNDP, 1994: 
31). Essentially, community security is a sense of security derived from a sense of trust of 
neighbours and participation in and belonging to a community. However, if we see 
communities as social networks – not necessarily overlapping with geographic or ethnic 
units – community security should be viewed more broadly than aiming “to protect 
people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic 
violence” (UNDP, 1994: 32). In the literature relating to community security in practice, 
it also includes issues like the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), 
criminal violence by opportunists and vigilante groups, mistrust and lack of faith in the 
security forces to provide security to ordinary people (c.f. Hollestelle & Simonse, 2005). 
In this sense community security is seen as a response to the security threats of the 
community. Community security can also, however, be seen as a state of affairs 
(Saferworld, 2008a: 20).  
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 We see community security both as an end state and the process in which 
communities develop responses to achieve this end state. Community security as an end 
state is the situation in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent 
conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state. 
Community security as a process means that communities participate in identifying and 
prioritizing their security needs, as well as in the development and implementation of 
appropriate responses for their security needs. 
 
 
Community Security and Weapons Demand 
 
Post-conflict, „fragile‟ states are often characterized by the decay of socio-cultural 
and institutional processes that normally keep limits on the use of violence and the goal is 
to restore or create such processes and bring back security. As the proliferation of arms is 
a big obstacle to security, disarmament is a logical measure. However, complete 
disarmament is often not feasible (at least initially) and registration of firearms, 
establishing clear criteria, and regulating use (e.g. not carrying guns in the open) can be a 
first step (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 14). Yet, fragile states are far from the most 
desired environment to enforce laws, assuming SALW proliferation can indeed be 
managed by controlling supply, and ignoring the demand side.  
 Whitehead argues that the demand for small arms in fragile states or after conflict 
remains high because individuals are increasingly viewing their security as a privately 
provided good. In states with little capacity to provide for security, this gap is filled by 
“more individualist approaches that make more intensive use of SALW” (Whitehead, 
2007: 6-7). Failed political leadership and failure of the state to provide security have 
eroded trust in government. Consequently, initiatives evolve to organize security at sub-
state level, such as at regional and community level. This makes endeavors to restore (or 
achieve) the state‟s monopoly on violence inherently problematic (ibid, 24).  
 Based on the analysis that the demand for SALW is a phenomenon that occurs at 
the community level, it can be argued that a response to the demand of SALW must also 
– at least in part – be targeted at that level. Given the lack of trust in state security 
providers, in the short term, enhancing community security may be the only way to fill 
the security-gap while creating room for security as a collective good, rather than a 
private good.  
 
 
How is Community Security Organized? 
 
What community initiatives are there in this regard? How is community security – 
as a process – organized? To the extent that they are known, community-based initiatives 
to enhance security include traditional peace committees, peace zones and community-
based policing. We elaborate on each category here. 
Willemijn Verkoren, Rens Willems, Jesper Kleingeld and Hans Rouw  5 
 
 
 
Traditional Peace Committees 
 
Peace committees consist of a number of community members and can be 
organized to address one specific issue – e.g. the proliferation of arms in the community 
– or a multitude of goals. They can play monitoring roles to ensure accountability of 
locally-based security forces, bring political parties together and make them accountable 
to their constituents, and create a space for dialogue to address fears, mistrust and issues 
of exclusion (International Alert & Friends for Peace, 2007: 9). Where such traditional 
systems do not (or no longer) exist, an effort can be made to create (or revive) them. 
Examples of traditional systems that have been used or revived to enhance community 
security include the sungusungu, which is the new term for a traditional system of 
governance among tribes in Southern Kenya and Tanzania, and which was revived to 
deal with an increase in cattle raiding (Marwa, 2002; Bukurura, 1996: 257-266); the 
barza communautaire in the DRC, in which civil society, the local administration, police, 
army, and representatives of the population jointly discuss their issues, and elect local 
peace committees (Van Puijenbroek, Elela & Malolo, 2008: 42; Frerks & Douma, 2007); 
peace committees formed by Resources for Peace and Reconciliation (RPR) in Mannar, 
Sri Lanka, to help war returnees and to restore the social fabric, which mediate in local 
disputes and and are beginning to deal with the proliferation of small arms (Williams, 
2005: 32). „District Peace Committees‟ in Northern Kenya formed at the initiative of a 
number of CSOs in order for communities to find home-grown solutions and peace 
initiatives for the security problems they encountered, including banditry and cattle 
raiding (Muchai, 2005: 123-4).  
 
Peace Zones 
 
Another example of community-based initiatives to improve community security 
are so-called „Gun-Free Zones (GFZs),‟ social spaces created by communities where 
guns are prohibited. These initiatives have been particularly prevalent in South Africa. 
Although the impact differs from GFZ to GFZ, people are not carrying firearms as often 
as before, gun-use is de-normalized, and perceptions of safety have improved. Also, it 
enhanced the social cohesion in communities and provided residents with a forum to 
express their commitment to a more secure environment (Kirsten, Cock & Mashike, 
2006). Another example is the peace zones in Mindanao in the Philippines (Verkoren, 
2008). Created by local communities and helped by CSO pressure, these are zones where 
the warring parties promise not to attack.  
 
Community-based Policing 
 
Though not purely a bottom-up initiative, community-based policing (CBP) gives 
a voice to communities in their security provision while at the same time – and more 
importantly because of this – strengthening the police in their capacity to address security 
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issues. CBP is “an approach to policing that brings together the police, civil society and 
local communities to develop local solutions to local safety and insecurity concerns” 
(Saferworld, 2008b: 16), and is “increasingly recognized as an approach to policing that 
meets many of the post-conflict safety and security challenges” (SEESAC, 2006: i). In 
Kenya, for instance, Saferworld organized joint trainings to police officers and civil 
society representatives, conducted by both civilian and police trainers. Committees were 
formed of key stakeholders, and a joint police-community forum was established to meet 
monthly, “enabling members of the community, civil society and the police to identify 
appropriate strategies to tackle crime in the area” (Saferworld, 2008b: 16).  
Where a state is not able, but willing nevertheless, to fulfill basic services such as 
the provision of security, that state may outsource security and governance to local 
intermediaries. In a so-called “mediated state arrangement”, the state co-opts local, non-
state security providers to promote security whereby local security providers “operate 
beyond the state, its legal code, and its most coveted possession – its „monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence within its territory‟” (Menkhaus, 2008: 32). Of course, for such 
a strategy to work, the sources of local authority have to be relatively legitimate and 
committed to inclusive governance. While institutions closer to communities may 
generally be more open to control by the people, outsourcing security issues to local 
intermediaries is not without risk. Traditional systems, without guarantees that the rules 
are equal for all community members, can be exploited by powerful members in a 
community for political, economic, or personal gains. If the old elites that played a role in 
causing and maintaining war are again placed in power in newly organized peace 
committees, corruption, marginalization and conflict may resurface. The question is how 
to tackle these risk factors and keep local initiatives subject to the law; not unproblematic 
in a situation where the local initiatives arise precisely because the state is not enforcing 
the law. 
 Summarizing the first part of this article, we have defined community security to 
be both an end state and a process. As an end state, it is a goal towards which community 
security initiatives and DDR initiatives alike, should aim to work. Defining community 
security as a process however zooms in on the ways in which communities themselves 
act in response to security threats. From this perspective a number of initiatives have 
been discussed, showing that communities themselves can indeed find constructive ways 
to provide for their own security, sometimes with but also without outside help. Now, 
how can all this be related to DDR programs? 
 
 
DDR Programs and Community Security 
 
Recently, DDR programs have come under criticism for a number of reasons.
3
 
One issue is that DDR processes often tend to be relatively isolated from wider 
reconstruction, security reform and peacebuilding processes, severely limiting their 
success. In addition, a lack of national and local involvement undermines the 
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sustainability of programs. Connected to this, it is increasingly realized that the 
reintegration component is the most difficult and long-term aspect of DDR, needing 
much more attention and funding. Finally, there needs to be particular attention for the 
special needs of vulnerable groups such as female, handicapped and child combatants. 
We suggest that these issues relate directly to a lack of attention for community security 
in DDR programs.  
 How can we look at DDR from a community security perspective? We suggest 
five ways of doing so. First, the end state of community security can be seen as the 
overall aim of DDR processes. Second, if we take the process view, community security 
can also be a characteristic of DDR processes, which then need to take community 
participation in programming seriously. A third way of approaching this issue is to 
connect DDR programs to community security initiatives, such as traditional systems and 
peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing. Fourth, a certain level 
of community security should be seen as a precondition for DDR – i.e., a minimum level 
of trust and confidence on part of combatants and communities is needed for successful 
DDR. We will illustrate the importance of sensitizing ex-combatants to submit to DDR, 
as well as preparing communities for their return. Finally, a fifth way of looking at this is 
by analyzing what has been called community-based DDR. In this section, we treat the 
first four of these perspectives in turn. The next section addresses community-based 
DDR. 
 
 
Community Security as an Aim 
 
As we have mentioned, an important aim of DDR programs is to achieve a state 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. However, in post-conflict environments the 
process of monopolizing violence into the hands of the government often leads to a 
security dilemma in the short term because communities do not instantly trust the state 
with the ultimate provision of their security in a fragile post-conflict environment. 
Sudden disarmament right after the war has ended is unlikely to occur because of fear of 
being dominated or defeated by the government, often an actor in the conflict. Indeed, as 
Keane notes, the state‟s monopoly of violence could imply that citizens live under “a 
permanent cloud of threatened violence” (Keane, qtd. in Devetak & Christopher, 2007: 
12). The question is how this security dilemma can be overcome or circumvented. 
Transforming the government from a party in the conflict to a more inclusive 
representation of citizens is part of such trust building. In addition, the community has a 
role to play, not only as a recipient of security offered by the state, but as a crucial locus 
of trust and peacebuilding. Reinforcing community security mechanisms, as discussed 
below, then becomes part of the effort to achieve community security as an end state.  
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DDR and peacebuilding 
 
Approaching DDR from a community security perspective implies a more 
ambitious aim for DDR. Aiming at community security means tackling the root causes of 
conflict and weapons demand. This makes DDR part of a wider and longer-term 
peacebuilding process. Indeed, some are beginning to call for DDR to directly address 
issues of reconciliation and confidence-building, for example through joint community 
development activities, the organization of community dialogues, public healing 
ceremonies and traditional cleansing rituals, or the creation of transitional justice 
instruments (CICS, 2006a: 7). The question, however, is whether such activities should 
be part of DDR proper or be interpreted as a call for coordination or cooperation with 
other peacebuilding actors, both prior to and after the start of the DDR process. The 
answer to this probably depends on the circumstances. The main point is that DDR can 
only reach these aims by connecting strategically to other peacebuilding activities. This 
means approaching DDR with a long-term perspective. Instead of placing the weight 
primarily on the quick collection of arms, the focus is on reconciliation and economic 
development, and not only of ex-combatants but also the communities in which they 
reintegrate. This could for instance imply that reintegration activities of DDR are 
increasingly blurred with community development and local forums for reconciliation. 
Also, DDR can be geared further towards development and reconciliation by involving 
ex-combatants from the DDR program into other activities, such as construction and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and schools, or sensitization campaigns for civilian 
disarmament. 
 
Ensuring sustainable livelihood security 
 
From a community security perspective, a person is successfully reintegrated not 
only when (s)he refrains from taking up arms again in the short term, but when her/his 
personal security has improved to such an extent that also in the longer term peace can 
prevail. This entails an increase of people‟s economic, social, cultural, environmental and 
political security (UNDP, 1994). In order to create security in all these facets, 
reintegration programs need to match the local political and socio-economic context. A 
thorough analysis needs to be undertaken to map the “opportunity structure into which 
ex-combatants will be absorbed – both country-wide and in the specific communities of 
settlement – in terms of land, labour and other markets, as well as education and training 
opportunities, micro-credit services and other business development opportunities” 
(CICS, 2005: 34; Specker, 2008: 20-22). However, DDR programs have difficulty in 
achieving a smooth transition from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. As 
demobilized fighters receive their reinsertion assistance and arrive in their communities, 
there is often little or no support there to get reintegration going. Development 
organizations are yet to arrive, and the communities themselves are still recovering from 
war. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the 
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African Great Lakes region was criticized for limiting reintegration to money and in-kind 
assistance (DAI, 2005), the provision of some minimal schooling, and the facilitating of 
people‟s return to their communities. After the former combatants had completed these 
formal steps of DDR, they disappeared from view (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 65). The intent 
was to link up with more long-term programs by the UN and NGOs, but this proved 
difficult, in part due to tensions between the World Bank and UN (Klem & Douma, 2008; 
Klem & Frerks, 2007).  
 Although the long-term and complex nature of reintegration receives increasing 
recognition and attention, the problem is that post-conflict economic environments tend 
to be characterized by high unemployment and limited prospects for putting newly 
acquired skills to use. For this reason reintegration has been called “the Achilles heel of 
DDR” (ISS, 2004). Based on studies of Sierra Leone, the DRC and Afghanistan, Klem 
and Douma conclude that due to such shortcomings, “reintegration activities provided 
mostly short-tem benefits and opportunities to ex-fighters, but often failed to deliver 
sustainable results. Many ex-combatants were unemployed and they had trouble eking 
out an income despite the training and assets they received” (ISS, 2004: 27). Indeed, the 
failure rate of businesses set up by ex-combatants is estimated to be between 60 and 80 
per cent (Specker, 2008: 21). There is general agreement that a better connection to 
processes of development is needed, but what exactly that entails often remains vague. 
The information necessary for better analysis and development of reintegration guidelines 
is generally lacking (ISS, 2004). For example, there is little clarity about where DDR 
ends and development begins. There may be a need to develop criteria for an exit strategy 
for DDR programs (Baaré, 2006: 9), which explicitly deal with the transfer to longer-
term development and poverty reduction. Moreover, a context-specific and tailored 
approach, that builds on the socio-economic reality on the ground as well as on the 
wishes and capabilities of former combatants, is uncommon in practice, if existent at all 
(Specker, 2008; Klem & Douma, 2008).  
 
 
Community Security as a Characteristic of DDR 
 
Combatants as part of communities 
 
A community security perspective implies taking a wider view of ex-combatants 
(for example, women often were not fighters but logistical helpers or sex slaves) as well 
as paying attention to groups who do not enroll in DDR programs. Women often tend to 
„self-demobilize‟ and disappear from view without accessing assistance and opportunities 
provided by DDR (CICS, 2006a: 25). In addition, extending support also to the families, 
social networks and wider communities into which ex-combatants are (re)integrated is 
increasingly considered an important element of DDR. This contrasts with previously 
implemented reintegration processes focused almost exclusively on providing support to 
individual ex-combatants. The key assumption of this type of programming was that by 
providing ex-combatants with skills and resources, these individuals would reintegrate 
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into civilian life on their own terms – an assumption that has been largely falsified (ibid; 
Ngoma, 2004: 83). The broadening of the target group for DDR beyond a narrowly 
defined category of former combatants is also necessary in order to prevent new tensions. 
After all, providing assistance only to ex-combatants („perpetrators‟) in a context in 
which all are deprived can lead to resentment on the part of other community members.  
 Although actual projects that target the potential reception communities of ex-
combatants have been a minority pursuit within the DDR sector (CICS, 2006a: 30), there 
are exceptions. Programs in Chad, Niger, Aceh, the Central African Republic, and the 
DRC, have included community participation in the reintegration phase (Özerdem & 
Sukanya, 2008: 35). In the DRC, a joint government-UNDP project in the framework of 
the MDRP has aimed at the creation or reinforcement of local networks and village 
committees in order to disseminate project information, promote community participation 
in socio-economic rehabilitation, and increase confidence and peaceful co-existence 
between communities and ex-combatants (MDRP, 2009).  
In Afghanistan, some argue that the failure to adopt a community-based 
reintegration program has imperiled the peace process. The individual approach to 
reintegration made individual soldiers susceptible to manipulation by commanders who 
were able to maintain their influence and authority over their soldiers. If a community-
based approach had been adopted for the program the problems encountered with the 
non-cooperative commanders might have been reduced. A community-based approach 
would have strengthened the ties between soldier and community, thereby reducing the 
chances the soldier would need to seek alternative forms of security (Thruelsen, 2006: 
42). 
 
Community involvement  
 
What would such a community-based approach look like? There are different 
levels of community involvement in planning and implementation. One might say there is 
a continuum ranging from community „sensitization‟ to „consultation‟ to „participation‟, 
„ownership‟, and finally „empowerment‟. Pouligny argues that communal consultation is 
necessary to become acquainted with the local conditions to which DDR programs are to 
be tailored (Pouligny, 2004: 11). Such consultation processes could occur simultaneously 
with the disarmament and demobilization phase of the DDR process when the ex-
combatants are cantoned, and under certain conditions even during the design phase of 
DDR. First, it helps to define priorities from a local perspective and establish 
accountability norms within communities, thereby ensuring some level of societal control 
during the reintegration process. This would address potential grievances on the part of 
the community and encourage the community and the ex-combatant to take first steps 
toward a reintegration (and rehabilitation) process. Secondly, communal consultation 
directly addresses community concerns with regard to special treatment of ex-combatants 
when given financial aid in return for agreeing to participate in a DDR process. Thirdly, 
community consultation will address memories of violence and open up discussion to 
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arrive at some form of justice. Consultation also opens up possibilities to draw on local 
experience and resources (UNSG, para 41; UNDP, 2005: 59). Such participatory 
processes can create a sense of community ownership and help to overcome distrust 
among former combatants, communities, and local authorities (Thusi, 2004: 23-4). This 
way, a confidence-building measure is created that promotes the likelihood of successful 
reintegration because the ground has been prepared for the community to receive ex-
combatants. 
 In practice, the concept of ownership is often limited to the national government, 
and sometimes the rebel leaders, to the exclusion of other key stakeholders (CICS, 2006a: 
6). In the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia it was noted that simply “creating a „national 
commission‟ is insufficient to ensure national ownership, in particular in facilitating 
social reintegration” (Solomon, 2008: 42). No wider representation of people and 
communities was achieved. As a result “citizens in both countries feel excluded from the 
planning and implementation of certain key programs, which in turn impacts on the 
sustainability of the program” (ibid). The MDRP, too, placed much emphasis on 
ownership by the host countries, particularly during its initial phase. However, many of 
the governments lacked the necessary capacity and/or willingness (DAI, 2005). After a 
mid-term evaluation criticized the MDRP for confusing national ownership with 
government ownership, the program realized that ownership should not mean to give the 
host government a carte blanche (ibid; Klem & Frerks, 2007: 64-6). The Integrated DDR 
Standards (IDDRS) developed by the UN in 2006 illustrate a learning curve in this 
regard, stressing that national ownership is “more than central government leadership” 
and involves “a broad range of State and non-State actors at national, provincial and local 
levels” (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 12). This means that “[l]ocal authorities and populations, 
ex-combatants and their dependants must all be involved in the planning, implementation 
and monitoring of DDR activities” (ibid). Similarly, the European Union (EU)‟s concept 
for DDR states that “DDR programs should be planned and delivered within the 
framework of community level development and include communities in all stages of the 
process” (European Commission, 2006: 25). In practice the European Commission (EC) 
has applied this approach to DDR in Colombia, where it supports the Colombian peace 
process through so called “laboratorios de paz”. These peace laboratories are 
comprehensive programs aimed at supporting peace initiatives at the local level (Koth, 
2005: 52).  
 However, in spite of a few such examples, the inclusion of a local ownership 
component in DDR support activities remains the exception rather than the rule. 
According to recent studies (CICS, 2006a: 6; Muggah, 2005: 2), programming often fails 
to promote effective participation. Programs only allow for very short reintegration 
periods, which necessitate rapid planning and implementation, thereby limiting the 
possibilities for participation and ownership. This may be the result of the ideology of the 
„liberal peace‟ on which many state-building exercises have been modeled. This ideology 
bases its interventions in post-conflict societies on macro-economic reform through 
market liberalization whereas only very limited attention is paid to economic conditions 
at grass-roots level. This results in an ill-founded “objectification of war-torn societies” 
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by donor-led interventions whereby post-conflict societies‟ distinct economic needs are 
not taken into account (Pugh, 2005: 23-42). There thus seems to be tension between on 
the one hand the commitment to a participatory approach with local ownership, and on 
the other hand, the detailed international blueprints for DDR that limit the possibilities for 
adjustment to specific contexts and needs (CICS, 2006a: 10-1).  
 
Community empowerment 
 
The concept of empowerment means that security promotion programs should not 
aim simply to protect people and provide security – but to empower people and 
communities to take care of their own security. Here we come close to the process view 
of community security as ways in which communities ensure their own security. 
Participation in decision-making can be a first step towards empowering communities to 
take care of their own security. In addition, communities may need capacity building 
aimed in order to strengthen existing security arrangements and other elements of civil 
society which may enhance community security. Indeed, the IDDRS talk about 
strengthening local communities and authorities, particularly with regard to rebuilding 
their capacities for strategic planning and program management (UN IAWG, 2006: 3.30, 
12). However, empowerment could also serve less technical goals considering a party is 
empowered by gaining new awareness and understanding of its goals, options, skills, and 
resources, and is able to utilize these new insights (Bush, Robert & Folger, 1994: 85-87). 
 So far these are, for the most part, only words on paper. A top-down approach still 
characterizes most DDR programs. Too often, these programs overlook potentially 
valuable inputs from grass-roots organizations and the communities which are supposed 
to benefit from the DDR program. As a result, they run the risk of not matching with the 
particular social, economic and political context in which DDR programs are being 
implemented. However DDR programs are run, their legitimacy and local embeddedness 
are of the utmost importance. Therefore, it is important that attention is paid to the social 
and political circumstances of each society, and balance the urge to engineer with the 
need for local ownership (Cooper & Pugh, 2002: 51). 
 
 
Connecting DDR to Community Security Arrangements 
 
How can national-level DDR programs connect to existing ways to organize 
community security such as weapons demand reduction, traditional peace committees, 
peace zones and community-based policing? The IDDRS acknowledge that although the 
primary role of disarmament within DDR is to disarm combatants in the immediate post-
conflict period, two wider dimensions need to be taken into account: that commonly it is 
also desirable and necessary to reduce and control the weapons held by the civilian 
population; and that short-term disarmament measures must be linked to longer-term 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) control. Thus, the removal of weapons from 
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combatants is only one aspect of disarmament within security promotion strategies. For 
instance, civilian disarmament, job creation and sensitization are also important if overall 
security is to be improved. Initiatives that go beyond formal cantonment and weapons 
destruction by DDR implementers become necessary. Community-based weapons 
collection and control programs, as discussed later on, may be a valuable addition in this 
regard (Greene, Hiscock & Flew, 2008: 13).  
 However, there are various obstacles that complicate efforts to reinforce 
community security arrangements as part of DDR or otherwise. First, the viability of 
community security mechanisms can be undermined by authorities that fear such bottom-
up approaches to security can turn into a source of opposition. In Somalia for example, 
hardliners in both the Transitional Federal Governments as well as the Council of Islamic 
Courts have embarked on policies designed to undercut rather than partner with local 
security initiatives (Menkhaus, 2007: 68). This was initially also the fear of the 
Tanzanian government with the sungusungu mentioned earlier. Second, the evolution of 
local, informal systems of security has often been invisible to external aid agencies that 
mostly focus on formal state structures. External state-building initiatives have at times 
undermined public security by disregarding existing informal security structures (ibid, 
70). One reason for this may be the illiberal nature of local security systems – a third 
issue. In Somalia, local security systems are the main if not sole source of security and 
protection for households and communities, but they often do not live up to international 
human rights standards. When aid agencies are committed to the promotion of 
community security, they are faced with the dilemma of whether or not to strengthen 
these structures (ibid, 92-3). Finally, a fundamental issue is that communities do not 
necessarily have shared values and beliefs, particularly in divided and fragmented 
societies (Baker, 2007: 138). This means that programs for community involvement in 
DDR should have built-in mechanisms for reconciliation and dealing with disagreement. 
 There may also be instances in which the connection between DDR and 
community security arrangements runs in the other direction: not national DDR programs 
trying to link up with community mechanisms, but community mechanisms helping to 
shape DDR programs. For example, the OECD (2007: 35) notes that pilot projects in 
Haiti that promote community-based armed violence reduction in slums have formed the 
template of national DDR and SSR strategies for Haiti.  
 
 
Community Security as a Precondition for DDR 
 
Community security is one of the determinants that impacts the decision to 
participate in a DDR program. Some degree of security and prospect for security is 
needed in the aftermath of war to convince ex-combatants to disarm. Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2009) identify two underlying mechanisms that influence the decision to join 
a DDR program. The first mechanism derives from the logic of the security dilemma. In 
an immediate post-conflict environment, the institutional infrastructure is usually very 
weak. Therefore, mutual mistrust may lead to unwillingness in taking the first step 
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toward disarmament. However, credible third party enforcers and credible commitment to 
community ownership of the DDR program can mediate in such crises of confidence and 
foster a degree of transparency that mitigates feelings of mutual suspicion. The second 
mechanism is the role of spoilers who seek to maintain the structure of their armed 
groups to use violence to undermine the peace efforts so they can bargain for more 
favorable returns. Both these mechanisms significantly impact on the decision whether to 
join a DDR program or not.  
 Rebel forces therefore tend to be reluctant to disarm in the absence of security 
guarantees. Even though external actors may provide security for the transition period in 
the form of peacekeepers, additional assurances are often needed in order for the 
combatants to be persuaded to lay down their arms; for example, in the form of rebels 
retaining their own armed forces or becoming integrated into the new army, rather than 
being unarmed (Møller and Cawthra, 2007: 180). Often there is a preference on the part 
of the government to retain (or obtain) the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and 
therefore to suggest military integration into the new army as the most feasible option. 
However, in the longer term, armies have to be downsized and demobilization becomes 
inevitable. 
 
Different security environments 
 
The level of security during the implementation of DDR has a great impact on the 
program‟s results. One aspect of importance is the way the conflict was resolved. Most of 
the time there was a peace agreement (Caramés and E. Sanz: 2008: 11-13), but 
disarmament is sometimes also undertaken by force. The latter is often less successful, 
and therefore less desirable. During the implementation of a DDR program there may be 
high levels of criminal violence. This is something DDR is designed to prevent but not to 
deal with when it occurs, and other security promoting activities may be required. There 
can also be an ongoing conflict such as in eastern DRC or Burundi before the Forces 
Nationales de Libération signed the peace agreement. In the DRC this has led to ex-
combatants going into DDR for quick economic gains, only to return to the rebel groups 
afterwards (Rouw & Willems, 2010). Ongoing conflict increases the risk of DDR 
becoming a political and economic plaything of the remaining armed groups. Moreover, 
uncertainty and ongoing conflict can prevent DDR from being fully implemented, such as  
the case in Sudan. 
 
Flexibility and adapting to circumstances 
 
Of course the ideal conditions for DDR are never there, but it should be taken into 
account that certain conditions (e.g. levels of trust and confidence in the peace process) 
can support or may even be required for DDR. What is important in this regard is that 
policy makers understand from the outset that DDR involves much more than a mere 
“technical fix.” The local population is likely to perceive every intervention as a political 
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initiative that upsets the existing power balance, and, accordingly, will calculate what 
they stand to gain or lose from the effort (O‟Neill, 2005: 2). The challenge therefore is to 
demonstrate the positive impact of a new approach, for example through pilot projects 
that build legitimacy and credibility for wider reform programs (OECD-DAC, 2007: 35). 
As disarmament is such a highly political and sensitive issue, trust is the essential 
ingredient for success. Trust takes time to develop and therefore disarmament may be 
easier to agree on once a certain degree of stability has been achieved. An interesting 
alternative that may prove effective is a gradual approach to disarmament (Jeong, 2005: 
45). If armed groups agree to hand in a number of weapons at fixed intervals, former 
antagonists‟ confidence in the successful conclusion of DDR is checked over a given 
period of time. This method may decrease tension and replace it with greater willingness 
to disarm. However, this does not mean reintegration programs should be halted. 
Combatants‟ reluctance to disarm is related not only to the need for security guarantees in 
the short-term. Longer-term future prospects also play a role. Dissatisfaction with a peace 
accord can be associated with unemployment since people who have not found a job 
judge the peace accord more harshly. This affects one‟s perceptions of future security, 
which may lead one to conclude that having a gun offers more security than having none. 
This also points to the need to manage the expectations of ex-combatants in order to 
prevent disillusionment with civilian life. High expectations about their well-being upon 
return to their community far too often lead to disappointment and perceptions that the 
DDR program has not fulfilled its promises.  To ex-combatants, it then may turn out that 
economic well being in civilian life is not as profitable as livelihoods sustained by using 
arms (ibid, 145-6). 
 Thus, for combatants to submit to disarmament, they have to feel sufficiently 
secure – both physically and economically. Prospects for successful reintegration can 
help convince combatants to disarm. In some cases, this can mean that reintegration 
measures, such as sensitization efforts to prepare the ground for a successful reintegration 
process should precede disarmament. Starting with sensitization and trust building, if 
successful, reduces the need to carry arms.
4
 Letting go of the standard sequence of D, D 
and R also creates room for different divisions of labor. Disarmament and demobilization 
(and possibly some form of reinsertion) could take place through state-based 
programming and reintegration through community-based programming. The 
reintegration component can then be initiated alongside DD programming and focus on 
the whole of war-affected communities, while the DD phases can continue to serve the 
security issues with a special focus on ex-combatants. 
 
 
The gap between community security and DDR 
 
Summarizing the second part of this article, we have suggested four ways of 
looking at DDR from a community security perspective. First, an end state of community 
security can be seen as the overall aim of DDR. In this regard, we may ask whether DDR 
programs meet community security needs – something which in practice, they often do 
16  From DDR to Security Promotion 
 
 
 
not. Second, if we take a process view, community security can also be a characteristic 
of DDR processes, which then need to take community participation in programming 
seriously. This led us to a discussion of empowerment and capacity building, approaches 
which play only very limited roles in the implementation of most DDR programs. Part of 
the reason for this may be that there is little clarity on what empowerment means and 
how it should be done. A (participatory) analysis of community arrangements and 
institutions is needed which can show which of them are potential carriers of community 
security across the lines of conflict, and what it takes for them to achieve their potential. 
In addition, more insights are needed in what security means to a community. Given the 
short time frames employed for DDR, such analyses are rarely done, and are not 
mentioned by most policy documents as a step to be undertaken.
5
  
 A third way of approaching the issue is to connect DDR to the community security 
arrangements, as they were described earlier: SALW demand reduction, traditional peace 
committees, peace zones and community-based policing. One way to connect DDR to 
community security arrangements would be for DDR actors to strengthen these 
arrangements as a matter of policy. In addition, the connection between DDR and 
community security arrangements may also run in the other direction, with community 
mechanisms helping to shape national DDR programs, as it occurred in Haiti. This 
requires DDR programming to be flexible and open to community involvement. Finally, 
some level of community security is also a precondition for DDR. Convincing 
combatants to submit to DDR requires a basic level of confidence that they will be 
secure, both physically and economically, after they give up their arms. This can mean 
that efforts at reintegration, such as sensitization, should already be introduced before 
disarmament is undertaken. In other words, the sequencing of DDR may need to be 
changed. 
  In DDR practice, we see that lip service is paid to community security, as well as 
to elements that can help make these a reality, such as strategies of empowerment and 
capacity building, the involvement of community and civil society representatives in 
DDR design, treating DDR as part of both wider peacebuilding and longer-term 
development efforts, and providing assistance not only to former combatants but to 
communities as a whole. However, overall, this support is not translated into practice. As 
a result, there is a disconnect between community security arrangements on the one hand, 
and „state‟ DDR programs on the other.  
 There are various reasons for this. Here, we mention five. First, a military 
perspective on security of the state is often the starting point of DDR programs, resulting 
in a focus on the disarmament and demobilization phase at the cost of attention, financing 
and resources for the reintegration phase. This has led to growing critiques, as it has been 
realized that the success of ex-combatants largely depends on the community‟s socio-
economic ability to receive them. Second, DDR tends to be treated as a technocratic 
issue. There is insufficient attention for the fact that DDR is a very political intervention, 
which upsets existing power balances, and that therefore, careful attention should be paid 
to not only „do no harm‟ but also contribute to the wider peace process. Third, there is 
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little understanding of what empowerment and capacity building should actually entail. 
There is far too little discussion about this. Little use is also made of experiences which 
NGOs and others have with these strategies. Fourth, the dominant blueprint approach to 
DDR (exemplified by the detailed guidelines contained in the IDDRS) limits possibilities 
for flexibly adapting DDR to whatever community security needs and arrangements there 
may be in a given context. This approach also leaves little room for civil society input 
into DDR programming. It turns NGO partners into subcontractors, which negates their 
potential added value as connectors between communities and DDR programs and as 
actors who have experience with capacity building approaches.  
 Finally, the short time frames employed for DDR leave little time for the analysis 
of community security structures and the identification of suitable partners that may be 
strengthened to achieve sustainable community security. As a result, valuable input from 
local communities on how security can be improved is omitted. In addition, short time 
frames limit possibilities for starting integration early on and for connecting it to longer-
term community development processes. Both the blueprint approach and the short time 
frames used spring from the need to have DDR programs operational as early as possible 
in a peace process, so that they can start removing the security dilemma and show 
combatants and community some „peace dividends.‟ However, these imperatives have to 
be weighed against the requirements for achieving long-term success. This could be 
better achieved when ex-combatants and the communities into which they reintegrate 
have the freedom to tailor security provision according to their self-identified needs and 
can exert more initiative, control and responsibility to oversee activities related to the 
provision of security.  
 Then, is there nowhere that we can look for bridges that connect community 
security and DDR? There is, in fact, one area of practice that we have not yet addressed, 
but that may potentially lend inspiration. This is the field of „community-based DDR‟ to 
which we shall turn now.  
 
 
Community-Based DDR 
 
Experiences with Community-Based DDR 
 
Only a small number of community-based initiatives have been identified, which 
apart from reintegration, are also aimed at disarmament. Generally, it is argued, DDR 
does not spontaneously arise from below, but is part of a broader project to secure the 
legitimate control of force from above (Muggah, 2009: 2). Nevertheless also the first 
phases of DDR can involve the grass-roots level. One example involving communities in 
disarmament is given by a UNIDIR publication written by civic leaders from Sierra 
Leone (Lappia, 2006: 131-9). Recommendations include the arrangement for community 
heads and war commanders to meet in an atmosphere of friendliness to engender 
confidence in all parties and reinforce the message of „no more war‟. In addition, 
community leaders themselves should work out modalities for disarming groups. A 
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message must be sent out that supplies of arms and ammunition can easily undermine the 
fragile peace process, and it should be an urgent priority to publicly and openly collect 
and destroy all weapons and ammunitions. Other suggestions are to promptly put in place 
local, democratic structures of governance to enhance the transfer of power from 
combatants to official structures under law and to provide attractive conditions for 
combatants in the demobilization camps. 
 Another example of a stronger involvement of communities in DDR programs 
comes from Rwanda. The DDR program in Rwanda was completely managed by the 
Rwandese government, which implemented it through the local concept of Ingando –the 
military assembly area where troops received their final briefing before a military 
campaign. Refashioned for DDR, the concept was used to help ex-combatants through 
problem-solving workshops. According to Edmonds et al., this element of local 
ownership was vital for the program‟s success (Edmonds, Mills & McNamee, 2009: 42).  
 In addition to such modalities of community involvement in national DDR 
programs, there are also examples of what may actually be seen as community-based 
DDR. Increasingly, voices can be heard in favour of a „decentralized approach to DDR‟ 
(Faltas, 2005) that aims to address the root causes of arms in societies and that focus not 
on combatants alone, but on communities as a whole. Since the context in which DDR 
programs take place is often characterized by unemployment and impoverished 
economies, leaving little for ex-combatants to reintegrate into, bringing ex-combatants 
„on par‟ with the rest of the community is not enough. DDR should be linked to programs 
aimed at community development and reconciliation between communities and ex-
combatants. Development is then seen as a key for successful disarmament, just as 
disarmament is seen as a requisite for development (Haden & Faltas, 2004; Pouligny, 
2004: 17; USAID, 2005: 5-8; Koyama, 2005: 75; Swarbrick, 2007: 51-2). In this context, 
Muggah (2009) discusses what he calls „second generation‟ security promotion 
interventions, which focus on preventing and reducing armed violence. They involve 
local, customary institutions and privilege bottom-up approaches by focusing on 
community-centered security promotion. Second generation security promotion combine 
a number of activities, such as voluntary weapons collection, and temporary restrictions 
on weapons-carrying and alcohol use. Other examples include weapons for development 
programs, weapons lotteries and gun-free zones. What we have termed „community 
security initiatives‟ could perhaps also be placed under Muggah‟s heading of second 
generation security initiatives. Thus far, according to Muggah, second generation security 
promotion interventions have demonstrated significant reductions in armed conflict. In 
Colombia, homicide rates dropped significantly due to focused interventions that targeted 
the various dimensions of arms availability (Muggah, 2009: 276-7). 
 One interesting example is found in the DRC. In Maniema province civil society 
organizations, organized in la Société Civile de Maniema, called for the return of Mai 
Mai militia members into civil life. Subsequently, Oxfam Novib and the Conseil 
Régional des Organisations Non Gouvermentales de Dévelopment au Maniema 
(CRONGD) started a pilot project of the Social Cohesion/DDR program with activities 
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directed towards sensitizing for a voluntary disarmament.  The first phase of the program 
aimed at restoring social cohesion and confidence in the communities by means of socio-
economic rehabilitation and the restoration and improvement of the barzas, large 
community meetings and the traditional structures of community conflict mediation 
(CRONGD-Oxfam, 2006). The second phase aimed at a voluntary disarmament based on 
the principle of „weapons for development‟: if livelihood security of communities is 
increased, then they may become less dependent on the possession of arms. Development 
activities in this context included agricultural assistance and the rehabilitation of 
infrastructure, two schools and a health centre (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2007). According to 
Oxfam Novib the barzas played a central role in conflict resolution and in reintegrating 
perpetrators and victims, which helped in the implementation of the program (Oxfam 
Novib, 2008: 4, 10).  
 A quite unique instance of community-based disarmament occurred in Somaliland 
(OECD-DAC, 2008: 43). Armed young men extorting taxes from the civilian population 
for protection and robberies were a great security problem. The government of 
Somaliland initially formally announced a disarmament process but lacked the capacity 
and authority to implement it. Instead a community-based effort involving civil society 
groups, traditional and religious leaders and women‟s groups set up a campaign to ban 
firearms from the streets. The strategy was to stigmatize the possession and use of 
firearms and men with guns were shunned, hackled on the streets and refused services. In 
a matter of weeks the streets were cleared of weapons and popular support was created to 
persuade clan militias to disarm and join the national security forces. 
 Most community-based DDR initiatives do not concern themselves with 
disarmament but focus on reintegration. Here, again, the extent of community 
„ownership‟ varies among projects. In the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) the UNDP 
and IOM jointly launched a disarmament and reintegration program between 2000 and 
2002. After being criticized to be rewarding perpetrators of violence, the UNDP linked it 
with its Community Action for Post-Conflict Recovery project (Action communautaire). 
In this project, community infrastructure was (re)constructed and communities 
themselves identified, and the activities that required funding were executed when 
possible. Ex-combatants participated in highly labor intensive activities, such as the 
reconstruction of bridges and roads (Haden & Faltas, 2004). In Liberia, the UNDP‟s 
DDRR
6
 program eventually expanded its target group from ex-combatants to also include 
war-affected communities. A Community Based Recovery (CBR) program was initiated, 
which aimed for the consolidation of peace and stimulation of governance at the grass-
roots level. The CBR program restored existing community-level governance structures 
strengthened by developing „District Development Committees.‟ This enabled 
communities to identify community projects. The UNDP‟s ex-combatant reintegration 
and community support project in the Central African Republic (CAR) involved the 
communities in a different way in the reintegration of ex-combatants (UNDP, 2004). 
Each combatant received a reintegration voucher to hand in at the local office for 
reintegration in the community into which they wanted to resettle. Each community 
would then receive the amount of funds equivalent to the number of vouchers collected. 
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 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has developed 
a model for what it calls community-focused reintegration and implemented it in 
Burundi, DRC and Liberia. These projects include training for mixed groups of ex-
combatants and other community members, as “one of the most pressing problems in all 
countries was the need to provide skills to ex-combatants and others in order to involve 
them in the re-building of communal life” (USAID, 2005: 20). These involve leadership 
training as well as vocational training programs. They first train a group of „master 
trainers‟ who then pass it on community-level „learning facilitators‟ (who come from the 
community itself) which duplicate the training at community level. The cycles of training 
are then generally followed by support for a community project. The training and 
subsequent projects bring together ex-combatants and community members.  
 
 
Lessons Learned from Community-based DDR 
 
Literature about community-based DDR stresses that careful assessment of the 
context is critical; even more so because the logistical complexity of a community-based 
program and its longer commitment makes it not as easy to change the area of focus. 
Such assessments should be based on the local context and the security needs as 
perceived by those affected by the violence (OECD-DAC, 2008; Miller & Rudnick, 
2008). Another observation made by USAID is that community-based reintegration is 
best suited to attract rank-and-file combatants, but the creation of a political space for 
commanders “to redirect their energies in a post-war environment is important for 
shifting the conflict from the battlefield to the political arena” (USAID, 2005: 22). It is 
further emphasized that good planning on follow-up is necessary in order to prevent 
exacerbating tensions due to raised expectations.  
 Earlier we discussed how DDR needs to be accompanied by peacebuilding and 
reconciliation processes in order to be successful. For community-based reintegration, 
this means that its success is enhanced when it helps to “promote reconciliation and 
provide the tools to prevent local conflicts from recurring” (ibid, 7). By addressing local-
level reintegration and reconciliation, for instance by means of peace committees, this 
could mollify local tensions that are at the core of the conflict. As argued by Kalyvas, 
these local issues are the real issues that individuals are fighting over and when properly 
addressed through peaceful means this can take away political space for conflict at the 
national level (Kalyvas, 2003). 
 Muggah emphasizes that in second generation initiatives, involvement on the part 
of international agencies is much more scaled-back and facilitative. The initiative, control 
and responsibility of overseeing such activities rest much more with local actors. In a 
description that resonates with the concept of empowerment, Muggah classifies second 
generation initiatives as a “means transforming the normal and bureaucratic reflexes to 
standardize, simplify and control in a dominating top-down mode to provide instead 
conditions for local diversity and autonomy” (Chambers, 2007: 73).  
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Holistic Security Promotion 
 
A more holistic thinking about post-conflict security promotion is needed, in order 
to move beyond ad-hoc operations to a more strategic view of how different activities, 
including DDR, can work together. This requires security-oriented programs to start with 
long-term and detailed planning processes, based on good analysis, and a proper 
consultation process with host government and affected population based on principles of 
participation, ownership and empowerment (CICS, 2006a: 11).  
 A more top-down approach does not become superfluous when community-based 
approaches are initiated, as the two should rather reinforce each other. Centralized DDR 
and community security can complement each other when DDR programs connect to 
community security arrangements. Strong coordination of community-based projects 
with the official state-focused DDR programs, however, proves to be difficult in practice. 
It is not always clear what a community-based approach entails when reviewing policy 
documents. Unclear objectives and differing views about this reflect controversies 
surrounding the question whether to target individual families and households as opposed 
to all vulnerable households or the community as a whole (Chobok, 2005: 34).  
 Since community security arrangements increase security and reduce potential 
security dilemmas, they make it easier for ex-combatants to disarm, and for communities 
to accept ex-combatants. DDR programs could become more effective by connecting to 
such arrangements. At the same time, community-based institutions may also help 
shaping national DDR programs, as happened in Haiti. This requires DDR programming 
to be flexible and open to community involvement. In practical terms, linking DDR and 
community initiatives requires detailed knowledge of community security arrangements, 
„social fabric‟, local business, and the needs and capacities of former combatants, 
vulnerable groups, and wider communities. With regard to economic needs, an inventory 
on what is demanded by local communities themselves is likely to yield better output in 
terms of livelihood improvement. Many communities depend on their own skills and 
resources and identify their own strength through diverse economic activities. 
Incorporating ex-combatants in productive sectors in combination with a clear assessment 
of the needs and qualities of communities and ex-combatants alike would contribute to a 
reduction in social friction (Jeong, 2005: 140-143). It requires research at an early stage 
of DDR design, in close cooperation with local communities. The United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)‟s Security Needs Assessment Protocol 
(SNAP) could lend inspiration in this regard as it aims to generate explicit community-
level knowledge about security concerns in a rapid manner. Engagement of local 
communities will assure a better identification of local security concerns and related local 
practices.  
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Parallel Stages 
 
Letting go of the chronological order of the phases of D, D, and R provides new 
options of connecting community and state. One option would be to leave disarmament 
and demobilization (possibly including some form of reinsertion) to a state-focused 
approach and to complement this with a simultaneously running community sensitization 
program. The first program would turn the combatants into ex-combatants, while the 
second program would focus on the war-affected communities and prepare them for the 
return of ex-combatants to the community (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 20-1). This could be 
followed by a community-based reintegration and rehabilitation program, which focuses 
on both the needs of ex-combatants and communities. Moreover, as community-based 
disarmament experiences show (albeit still limited in number), there is also much to be 
said for expanding possibilities for community involvement in the D‟s. Community-
based programs seem quite capable of undertaking DDR in a different sequence, as the 
example of CRONGD and Oxfam in the DRC has illustrated. 
 
Multifaceted Violence 
 
As Cramer (2007) proposes, it may also be helpful to stop distinghuising between 
conflict and non-conflict violence. All types of violence represent threats to human 
security, and all are related in ways that are much more complex than is commonly 
suggested. For example, after a war is over and soldiers are demobilized, there is often a 
sharp increase in criminal and domestic violence (Muggah, 2006). The OECD-DAC‟s 
Armed Violence Reduction and prevention (AVR) policy represents an attempt to link 
together community security, community-based DDR, and state-centred approaches, 
seeing them as components of an all-encompassing violence reduction strategy (OECD-
DAC, 2008). The document emphasizes that all programs should be based on an 
understanding of the multifaceted and multi-level nature of armed violence. This can 
open up opportunities for cross-pollinations and make possible “multi-sector and multi-
level responses that address elements and interrelationships across the armed violence 
lens” (ibid, 51). Similarly, the CICS project argues that programmers should start from a 
typology of armed violence and seek to understand how this violence is best addressed 
through either DDR, SALW control or a combination (CICS, 2006b: 7). 
 
Context Matters 
 
The degree of reliance on community-based initiatives as compared to state DDR 
programs is likely to vary depending on the context. For example, in cases where the 
distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred, demobilization through national 
camps will have only limited success, and a community-based initiative would be more in 
place. Moreover, state DDR programs are often not capable of taking into account 
regional needs, or even differences between rural and urban needs. For instance, ex-
Willemijn Verkoren, Rens Willems, Jesper Kleingeld and Hans Rouw  23 
 
 
combatants living in a small apartment in the city of Kabul were given a cow (Frerks, 
Gompelman & van Laar, 2008: 26) and in the DRC ex-combatants returning to villages 
without electricity were trained to become electricians (Rouw & Willems, 2010: 30). 
Where a community-based approach can link to state-focused approaches will also differ 
from case to case. This may, for example, depend on the strength and accessibility of 
existing community arrangements.  
 
Who is in Charge?  
 
The literature on community-based approaches to DDR explain that addressing 
local tensions and reconciliation, organizing development, and tackling reintegration 
issues can and should be undertaken by members of the local community. They have to 
be in charge and the role of the international community is facilitation. The issues that 
need to be addressed for successful reintegration and increased community security are, 
for a large part, issues with local implications and need to be addressed in a process with 
local ownership. However, DDR is an instrument used to dismantle and disarm armed 
groups, usually undertaken by international agencies and national governments. This 
contradiction leads not only to an ambiguity over the definition of „community-based 
DDR‟ as discussed earlier, but more practically to the fundamental question concerning 
who is in charge of planning and implementing the program. It seems in practice there is 
very little ownership in transitory environments. Chesterman (2007) attributes this to the 
time-consuming and frustrating nature of consultative processes which is allegedly in 
contradiction with the perceived need to act swiftly. In addition, there is a tendency to 
base interventions on blue-print approaches (Chesterman, 2007: 17). For community-
based DDR it is presumed to be essential that the community is empowered and is not 
only beneficiary but also contributor and is carrying the weight of the decision-making 
process (Caramés, 2008: 31). Local ownership within a community-based approach 
would imply that different approaches to achieve reintegration and peaceful cohabitation 
are arrived at in different contexts because it is determined by each community itself.  
 
The Role of Civil Society Organizations  
 
In theory, NGOs and CBOs are well placed to make the connection between local 
and national initiatives and to work with communities. However, their role in DDR 
programs is often limited to that of sub-contractors. Instead, CSOs need to be involved in 
both DDR policy and strategy formulation and implementation. This requires more 
openness to CSO involvement on the part of donors, and a more proactive approach on 
the part of CSOs. In addition, capacity building of local organizations should receive 
much more attention, especially in the fields of context analysis and strategy 
development. 
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Assessing Results  
 
What continues to serve as a measurement of success of DDR programs are 
numbers of weapons collected and combatants that went through training programs, not 
the extent to which security has improved (Muggah, 2006: 197; Pugel, 2009: 76). 
However, the contribution of a project to the reduction of violence is hard to measure. A 
research initiative in the Republic of Congo, for instance, could not go further than 
recognizing the importance of “the effect that the project had on diverting youths away 
from the life of the gun” (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 29). A study in Colombia finds that 
paramilitary DDR did appear to have reduced homicidal violence, but these results also 
seemed to disappear over time (Restrepo & Muggah, 2009: 40). Also, the reintegration of 
ex-combatants is difficult to measure, as it is assessed more qualitatively and has a lack 
of effective indicators (Caramés, Fisas & Sanz, 2007: 10). Moreover, the 
multidimensional character of DDR programs and the whole peace process in which they 
are embedded makes it very difficult to assess the individual contribution of specific 
programs. Recently, there have been attempts to bring more rigor to the evaluation of 
DDR and its impact (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Muggah, 2009). However, there is 
still a significant lack of knowledge on the results of DDR programs. In any case, it is 
probably more realistic to look at what programs may have contributed to the 
achievement of community security: contribution rather than attribution. 
 
Challenges  
 
Although there may be many benefits to linking centralized DDR programs and 
community security initiatives, in practice, limited connection can be observed. There are 
many reasons why this is so. First, DDR by definition needs to be done under great time 
pressure. After a peace agreement, it is deemed necessary to act quickly to seize the 
momentum and generate the „peace dividend.‟ As a result, the time frames for DDR are 
short. This is not conducive to time-consuming participatory approaches. Hence, there is 
a tension between the urgency with which DDR needs to take place, and the necessity of 
extenstive analysis and community consultation before a security promotion strategy is 
adopted. Another process that takes time is that of fostering trust and confidence among 
former combatants and their communities. Communities do not necessarily have shared 
values and beliefs, particularly in post-conflict situations where years of violent conflict 
have left societies highly divided. In these situations, it may be difficult for external 
agencies to involve the communities in promoting security, without engaging in 
reconciliation and consensus building. Moreover, the chain of organizations involved in 
DDR implementation – from trust funds down to local NGOs – seriously impedes 
downward accountability.  
 A further complication is the identification of community security structures that 
are to be strengthened, considering that central DDR actors – governments, donors and 
international NGOs – lack knowledge of the existing informal systems of security. Most 
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external agencies focus on the easily visible formal state structures. Local and informal 
systems are less visible and therefore harder for outsiders to identify. In addition, many 
post-conflict societies exhibit multi-layered systems of governance, where besides the 
state, many actors of different levels are involved in the provision of security. Linking 
centralized DDR programs to community security initiatives requires a close knowledge 
of this complex situation, which is often lacking with DDR implementers. Furthermore, 
the post-conflict environment in which many DDR programs take place is not conducive 
to finding good local implementing partners. Often, local community organizations and 
NGOs in post-conflict countries lack the required capacity or are tainted by the past 
conflict. Within the short period in which DDR programs need to be started, there may 
not be time enough to find capable, trustworthy partners. In addition, not all local 
community security arrangements are in line with international human rights standards. 
For example they may exclude particular groups, or violate the rights of women or 
children. In addition, some local security providers are involved in criminal activities. In 
these cases, external agencies may be unwilling to link formal DDR programs to existing 
local security structures. 
 Besides these challenges in identifying community security initiatives and linking 
DDR programs to them, there are practical and political obstacles. DDR has often been 
approached as a highly technical, top-down activity. This has not allowed for much 
interaction with local DDR initiatives or community security arrangements. At the same 
time, there is often little room for such interaction because of the political nature of the 
DDR process and the interests of the actors involved. Rather than aiming for human 
security, most DDR programs aim at installing the monopoly of violence of the state 
(which often has never been there before or has been abused in the past). State level 
authorities may disapprove of support to community security arrangements, fearing that 
those may turn into a source of opposition. As such, there is great sensitivity about which 
groups are supported and how, and the need to navigate between the interests of the 
different parties can be an obstacle to engagement with communities.  
 Finally, donor convergence towards widely accepted standards and new funding 
and operational mechanisms have opened possibilities for mutual collaboration and 
coordination that hitherto were lacking, and enable more rapid implementation. Though 
these are very important achievements, they risk leading to „blueprint approaches,‟ 
inhibiting flexibility and openness to local input. What thus emerges again and again is 
the need to balance the important objective of coordinated and swift action with the 
objective of community security. Including local research and community involvement in 
planning as standard elements of security promotion guidelines could be one way to work 
towards such a balanced approach. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
DDR has become the standard way of addressing security threats in immediate 
post-conflict situations. However, DDR is designed to promote national security, rather 
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than human or community security. This creates severe obstacles for success, if success is 
seen in terms of overall security promotion rather than defined merely in numbers of 
arms collected and people demobilized. The reason is that if security at community level 
is not improved, then people will be unable to abandon armed violence as a way of 
protection and of making a living. Disarmament in such a situation will probably be only 
temporary. Thus, it is actually a necessity for DDR to aim at community security.  
 However, when community security becomes the aim, then this opens up 
questions about whether DDR is the most appropriate strategy. At best, it can be part of a 
more wide-ranging strategy, which in addition to top-down DDR programs also involves 
community-based activities. Altogether, such a holistic security promotion strategy 
should endeavour to make people and communities better able to protect themselves and 
to earn a living that does not depend on war and violence. In other words, it should aim at 
making guns redundant. „Community-based‟ and „Second-generation‟ DDR initiatives 
lend inspiration for such a wider security promotion approach. What they show is that the 
optimal approach is very context-specific. Analysis of the conflict, of local security 
mechanisms, and of the needs and capacities of communities, therefore has to be the first 
step, despite the fact that this takes valuable time.  
 
Notes 
1. Reports of the working group include: Willems et al (2009), Rouw and Willems (2010) and Willems, Kleingeld 
and Van Leeuwen (2010). 
2. These different perspectives on security can be problematic for donors and international organizations planning 
security promotion activities, for whom planning is based on lessons learned and thereby designed to be independent 
of, rather than account for, cultural variation. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 
states that “it is what makes security problems different from one community to another that is most important when 
designing activities specific to a community” (Miller & Rudnick, 2008: 31). In response, UNIDIR has developed a 
Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) which enables the generation of explicit community-level knowledge 
about security concerns in a rapid manner, and the reconciling of the findings with standing agencies and practices 
(Miller, 2007: 2). 
3.  Klem and Frerks (2007: 63) summarize the main issues mentioned in this debate. 
4. In addition to our earlier discussion of this, see also Berdal (1996: 24) Kingma (1997: 29). 
5. The SNAP project mentioned in note 1 may provide practical possibilities to fill this knowledge gap. 
6. The national program in Liberia was named Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
(DDRR). 
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